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ENFORCEMENT OF A WAREHOUSEMAN'S
LIEN AS STATE ACTION

Brooks v. Flagg Bros.
An individual commencing an action under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871' for violation of his constitutional rights

must establish that the conduct complained of constitutes action

taken under color of state law. 2 The allegation of state action 3 is

essential since neither section 1983 nor the fourteenth amendment
imposes constitutional limitations on the actions of private individuals.4 This requirement has created difficulties, however, since the
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
2

See id.

Courts have construed the "under color of" state law language of § 1983 to require the
same showing of state action required under the fourteenth amendment. United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Draeger v. Grand Cent., Inc., 504 F.2d
142, 146 (10th Cir. 1974); Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 396 F. Supp. 52, 60 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd mem., 516 F.2d 902
(6th Cir. 1975); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 810 (W.D.N.C.
1964), rev'd, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
The state action doctrine was enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
These five cases involved alleged discriminatory actions in violation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, 18 Stat. 335. Since that time, state action questions have arisen in cases involving
antitrust violations, see, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438
F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971), creditor's liens, see, e.g., Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975), and unlawful searches and seizures and Miranda
warnings, see, e.g:, State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971). A state action
inquiry is encountered most frequently, however, in actions alleging racial discrimination.
See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (lunchroom's refusal to serve
blacks under state-enforced custom); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (public restrooms segregated by Board of Health regulations); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (discrimination against blacks by owner of restaurant located in publicly
owned and operated building); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private political association's exclusion of blacks from voting in primary elections). The rationale behind the state
action doctrine was articulated by Justice Harlan in Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S.
244 (1963):
Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and
dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even
unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of protection from governmental interference. This liberty would be overriden, in the name
of equality, if the strictures of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were applied to
governmental and private action without distinction.
Id. at 250 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a general overview of the history and development of
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courts are often called upon to examine activities in which state
involvement appears minimal.5 Where conduct is actually performed by a state official' or state agency, 7 the existence of state
action is clear. Where the conduct is that of a private individual
acting pursuant to a state statute, however, resolution of the state
action question becomes problematic., One statutory provision giving rise to such a state action controversy, Uniform Commercial
Code section 7-210, provides for private enforcement of a warehouseman's lien by the sale of goods in the warehouseman's possession.,
the state action concept, see Bassett, The Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement
in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 39, 42-48 (1972); Burke & Reber, State Action,
CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the FourteenthAmendment, 46 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1041-82 (1973); Comment, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.: Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DICK. L. REv. 315, 316-17
(1977) [hereinafter cited as State Action].
I See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 526 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1976). See also State Action, supra note 4, at 339;
49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 578, 587 (1974).
6 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (participation by city police officers);
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (wrongful conduct by special police officer);
Robinson v. Jordan, 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (action performed by physician
in capacity as county health officer); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974) (public school teacher involved in illegal search). But see People v.
Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1967) (guard employed by government operated hospital not required to administer Miranda warnings). The state action
question becomes more complicated when both a state official or agency and a private person
or enterprise jointly participate in a given activity. As the participation of the public employee becomes more remote, a finding of state action becomes less likely. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1086-89 (1960).
1 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (building operation
and ownership vested in city parking agency); Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479
F.2d 1165, 1167 (2d Cir. 1973) (imposition of service charge by city agency); Kissinger v. New
York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (mem.) (refusal of city agency
to display certain political posters).
6 If a statute creates an "affirmative causal link between state ...
policy and the
challenged conduct," state action exists. Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 553
(9th Cir. 1974). A sufficient connection between the state legislation and the private act is
established when the statute actually compels, or at least encourages, conduct by private
individuals. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra. Similarly, if a "symbiotic relationship" is created whereby the state and the private party actively become partners, each conferring a "variety of . . .benefits" on the other, the private conduct will be deemed state
action. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961); see notes 49-52 and
accompanying text infra.
State action is also found where a statutory provision delegates a purely public function
to a private person. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Blye v. GlobeWernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973) (execution of
an innkeeper's lien was a traditional function of the sheriff). But see Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Davis v.
Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975) (extrajudicial execution of an innkeeper's lien does
not amount to state action).
I U.C.C. § 7-209 provides a warehouseman with "a lien against the bailor on the goods
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Recently, in Brooks v. Flagg Bros.'" the Second Circuit ruled that a
warehouseman's enforcement of a lien by the sale of goods pursuant
to section 7-210 is state action for the purpose of a section 1983 suit."
After her eviction from a Mount Vernon, New York, apartment
in June 1973, plaintiff Brooks arranged to have her furniture and
household possessions stored by defendant Flagg Brothers, Inc.' 2 A
dispute over the storage charges arose, and, upon her refusal to pay
the alleged amount due, plaintiff was notified that her goods would
be sold if the balance was not paid.' 3 Shortly thereafter Brooks
instituted an action in federal district court, " claiming that the
threatened sale, authorized by section 7-210 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),' 5 would deprive her of due process
in violation of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Finding
that a warehouseman's sale of goods under section 7-210 does not
constitute state action," the district court dismissed the comcovered by a warehouse receipt . . . for charges for storage or transportation ....
" A
warehouseman may enforce this lien, under U.C.C. § 7-210(2), "by auction [sale held] at a
specified time and place." Id. § 7-210(2)(c).
to 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g and remanding 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977).
1 553 F.2d at 766. Although the complaint also challenged § 7-209, which grants the lien
to the warehouseman, this issue was not raised on appeal. Id. at 769 n.10.
22 Id.
at 766-67.
23 Id. at 767. Brooks claimed that she was originally quoted a price of $65 per month
which would cover both moving and storage. Immediately after her goods were loaded on
defendant's truck, she was informed that the initial storage charges amounted to $178. Reluctantly, she paid this amount but shortly thereafter was billed for an additional $156 allegedly
due on the first month's charge. Id.
" Id. After the filing of the action, counsel for the parties reached an agreement under
which Brooks was permitted to regain possession of her furniture without paying the disputed
charges. Id. at 768.
IS N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964).
' Since the action was dismissed by the district court for lack of state action, the due
process question was never reached. This result is common in cases dealing with claims under
§ 1983. See, e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Money, 503
F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1974); Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
In cases in which the merits of the challenges to § 7-210 have been examined, courts have
reached differing results. In Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972),
the court concluded that it was unnecessary to decide the state action question because the
operation of § 7-210 would not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 338 F. Supp. at
466. The decision rested on three important factors: first, plaintiffs voluntarily and knowingly
delivered their property to the warehousemen; second, § 7-210 provides sufficient notice
before sale giving the owner an opportunity to obtain redress from the courts; third, the
property involved was not of such a nature that deprivation of it would cause serious injury
to the owner. Id. at 467. In contrast, the court in Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 78
Misc. 2d 762, 358 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974), modified, 48 App. Div. 2d 928,
369 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975), held that the sale of goods pursuant to § 7-210 is unconsti-
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plaint."
A divided Second Circuit reversed the lower court. Judge
Bryan, writing for the majority, 8 initially observed that "[t]he
under color of state law provision [of] § 1983 is equivalent to the
state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment."' 9 Pointing
out that a myriad of factors are relevant in determining whether
state action is present in a particular instance, the court reasoned
that the pertinent considerations in Brooks were U.C.C. § 7-210's
expansion of a warehouseman's common law remedies and its
tutional, because the statute does not provide the lienee a presale opportunity for a judicial
hearing. Mere notice that the goods will be sold, as required by the statute, was deemed
insufficient to satisfy due process requirements. A "prejudgment seizure . . . 'without an
order of a judge or of a court of competent jurisdiction [is] unconstitutional.'" 78 Misc. 2d
at 771, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (quoting Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716,
725 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)). The Jones court found Magro unpersuasive due to, inter alia, its
different factual setting. 78 Misc. 2d at 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
A statute similar to U.C.C. § 7-209, N.Y. LIEN LAW § 181 (McKinney 1966), provides an
innkeeper with a lien on the baggage and other property of a lodger for the proper charges
due for accomodations. The New York Court of Appeals has found this section to be unconstitutional, as "[plrocedural due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing"
prior to the sale. Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 20, 300 N.E.2d 710, 714,
347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 175 (1973) (emphasis added). A New York trial court, however, in IDS
Leasing Corp. v. Hansa Jet Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 741, 369 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1975), aff'd mem., 51 App. Div. 2d 536, 377 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1976), upheld
the constitutionality of § 184 of the lien law, N.Y. LIEN LAW § 184 (McKinney 1966) which
affords a garageman a lien on motor vehicles stored in his garage for storage charges due.
1"404 F. Supp. at 1061. Before the state action question was reached, the district court
considered the motion of Gloria Jones, who also was evicted from her home by a Mount
Vernon marshal, to intervene as a party plaintiff. 63 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court
permitted her to intervene under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2) because the legal issues involved
were identical to those presented in the Brooks action. 63 F.R.D. at 415. In the same order
permitting Jones' intervention, the court granted the motion of the New York Attorney
General and four storage associations to intervene as party defendants, since they shared a
common interest in upholding the constitutionality of § 7-210. In addition to the intervention
issue, the lower court was presented with a class action question which it never resolved.
Brooks had sought relief on behalf of herself and the class of persons whose property was
subject to sale pursuant to § 7-210. 404 F. Supp. at 1060. Plaintiff had proposed a class of
defendants consisting of" 'all warehousemen
who impose liens and subject goods to sale
pursuant to [the] New York Uniform Commercial Code ..
''.
Id. On appeal, the Second
Circuit, in its opinion reversing the lower court's resolution of the state action issue, urged
that the class action question be resolved immediately since it may bear heavily on the due
process claims. 553 F.2d at 774-75. The class action issue also is relevant to the question of
justiciability. Since both Brooks and Jones were allowed to reclaim their property before the
suit was resolved, an actual controversy may no longer exist. The plaintiffs may continue to
represent a class of persons whose property is stored in warehouses, however, as long as a real
controversy is present between the class and the defendant. See Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
11The Second Circuit panel consisted of Circuit Judge Timbers and District Judges
Bryan and Holden. Judge Timbers joined Judge Bryan in the majority opinion, while Judge
Holden dissented.
19 553 F.2d at 766 n.2.
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delegation of a traditional state power to a private person. 0 Although a warehouseman's lien was recognized at common law,
Judge Bryan found, such lien was enforceable only through judicial
proceedings. 2 ' In addition, the common law lien was limited to the
particular property for which the charges were owed. 22 In the Brooks
court's view, by enacting section 7-210 the state expanded a warehouseman's authority by allowing him to satisfy his lien without
judicial proceedings." The Second Circuit concluded that section 7210 thus effects "a complete circumvention of the judicial process,
by installing the warehouseman as the final and interested judge of
any dispute over storage charges, and as the sheriff who will enforce
his own decisions. 21 4 In addition to expanding the warehouseman's
common law rights, Judge Bryan noted, the U.C.C. provision delegates a traditional state function, the power to execute upon a lien,
to private warehousemen. 25 Reasoning that New York's enactment
of the statute therefore significantly enhanced the legal position of
a warehouseman, the Brooks panel concluded that the latter's enforcement of a 7-210 lien constitutes state action under section
1983.21 In support of this conclusion, the Brooks majority pointed to
a recent decision of a three-judge district courtz' in which it is suggested that a garageman's sale of an abandoned automobile, pur2 Id. at 771.
21 Id. at 771-72.

2 Id.
2Id.
21Id. at 772.
2 Id. at 771-72.
" Id. at 772. The Brooks court rejected the defendant's argument that a fine-print clause
in the contract gave it independent authority to sell the goods. Id. at 767 n.3. This seems in
accord with the general rule that fine print in an adhesion contract will not bind a party who
is unaware of it, especially where the clause would operate as a waiver of due process rights.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174,
188 (1972); Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 388 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark & Landers]; Note,
State Action and Waiver Implications of Self-Help Repossession, 25 ME.L. REv. 27, 38-39
(1973). See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
" Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D. Conn. 1976). At issue in Tedeschi was
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-150(e)(f) (West Supp. 1978), which permitted a police officer to
seize any apparently abandoned automobile. The statute authorized the garageman storing
such a vehicle to sell it in order to recover unpaid storage and towing charges. Id. Concluding
that the statutory scheme involved state action since the seizure process was initiated by a
state official, the Tedeschi court went on to state that the statutory sale authorization was a
sufficient independent ground upon which to predicate a finding of state action. 410 F. Supp.
at 42. Since § 14-150 did not afford the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, the Tedeschi
c6urt concluded that its operation violaterd plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 45.
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suant to statutory lien enforcement procedure, amounts to state
action.28
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Holden rejected the approach
adopted by the majority. 9 As an alternative, the dissent focused on
the actual involvement of the state in the 7-210 sale finding that
such involvement did not rise to a sufficient level to convert the
warehouseman's conduct into state action. 30 Noting that section 7210 does not compel a warehouseman to pursue the remedy it affords or establish a mutual relationship between the warehouseman
and the state,3' the dissent concluded that the controversy was essentially a private one in which the defendant storage company
merely chose to utilize the private remedy authorized by section 7210.32
553 F.2d at 773-74. In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied upon two of
its earlier decisions, Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974),
and Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
In Shirley, an action was commenced by the owner of an automobile which was repossesed
pursuant to a state statute. Dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), Judge Mulligan noted that the right of peaceful repossession without a
court order was recognized at common law. 493 F.2d at 742. Similarly, a § 1983 action
challenging the New York wage assignment statutes, N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 340-362 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW §§ 46-49b (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 19771978), was dismissed for lack of state action in Bond. 494 F.2d at 311. Basing its use of the
expansion of common law remedies test on the authority of these two decisions, the Brooks
court noted that in both cases state action was held to be absent, since the challenged statutes
merely codified and did not expand traditional common law remedies. 553 F.2d at 773.
553 F.2d at 775-76 (Holden, J., dissenting). Judge Holden's rejection of the expansion
of common law remedies test was based on two factors: first, that warehousemen were granted
a possessory lien on goods for unpaid charges at common law, and second, that enforcement
of the lien has been a private function since 1879. Id. at 775.
Id. at 775-76.
3, Id. at 776. The dissenting opinion pointed out a common problem encountered by
courts dealing with a situation where a private individual is authorized to act under state
law. While the usual predicate for a finding of state action is significant government participation in the private activity, by delegating its power to private persons the state divorces
itself from the private conduct. Thus, in such cases the tests applied focus upon whether the
private conduct is "so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state
action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966), quoted in Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d
at 775 (Holden, J., dissenting). Judge Holden concluded that the essentially private nature
of transactions between warehousemen and their customers results in an insufficient connection between the state and the remedy authorized by § 7-210 to lead to a finding of state
action. 553 F.2d at 775 (Holden, J., dissenting).
32 553 F.2d at 776. Both the First and Seventh Circuits share Judge Holden's view that
enforcement of a lien is essentially a private action. In Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st
Cir. 1975), the court ruled that a Massachusetts statute, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, §
23 (West 1959), affording an innkeeper the right to enforce a lien on property of absconding
guests did not sufficiently involve the state in the enforcement process to give rise to a finding
of state action. 512 F.2d at 202, 205. The court stated that the "legislature has made the
seizing and holding of property a matter of a private creditor invoking a private remedy."
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The Second Circuit decision in Brooks seems to reflect the current judicial interest in protecting a debtor's due process rights
against unrestrained efforts by creditors to secure payment of
debts.3 3 Unfortunately, however, in reaching its conclusion, the
Brooks majority appears to have deemphasized the state action requirement contained in section 1983. An analysis of the Brooks situation under the criteria utilized by the court, it is submitted, reveals
that the court's finding of state action is questionable.
Central to any state action inquiry is an examination of actual
government participation in the private activity.34 Under the warehouseman's lien enforcement procedure prescribed in the U.C.C.,
such participation appears minimal. By permitting a warehouseman to unilaterally enforce his lien, a state enacting section 7-210
in effect divorces itself from any involvement in the private activity.35 It is true that a grant of power to a private individual through

statutory enactment or constitutional amendment may render that
person's conduct characterizable as state action within the meaning
of section 1983 .3 In a case such as Brooks, however, where there are
no additional factors manifesting significant government participation, the delegation 7is an insufficient connection to satisfy the state
3

action requirement.

Although the private activities authorized by the statute do not
involve a significant degree of actual government participation,
Id. at 205. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit rejected a contention that because the sheriff
traditionally executed a lien on personal property, the delegation of that function to a private
person rendered the latter's actions those of the state: "At most it is one that has been shared
by the state with private persons." Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 15758 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
1 See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), wherein it is stated:
[D]ue process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice" and "hearing" which are
aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or
its unrestricted use.
Id. at 343 (emphasis in original). Similar concern was expressed by courts considering challenges to lien enforcement provisions of the U.C.C. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430,
441 (5th Cir. 1970); Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 43-55 (D. Conn. 1976); Sharrock
v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 56 App. Div. 2d 446, 450-53, 393 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169-70 (2d Dep't
1977). See also Clark & Landers, supranote 26 at 386-88; Rendleman, The New Due Process:
Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 535-43 (1975).
1 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); State Action, supra note 4, at 326-27.
See note 31 supra.

See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
37 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1968).
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state involvement may nonetheless be found under several different
theories. Pursuant to the expansion of common law remedies test
applied in Brooks, the focus is on the statute's enhancement of the
individual's common law remedies." While the provisions of section
7-210 expand the warehouseman's common law rights, 9 this factor
by itself is not sufficient to support the Brooks holding." Moreover,
as Judge Holden pointed out in his dissent, the common law test
may not accurately reflect the degree of involvement on the part of
the state.4' The question whether a statute creates a new right for
private individuals or merely codifies existing rights seems irrelevant to the state action determination, as it does not reveal "the
impact of the law upon [the] private [activity]."42 Related to the
3 The expansion of common law remedies test applies in instances where a state has
provided a private individual with a remedy unknown at common law. See, e.g., Tedeschi v.
Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D. Conn. 1976); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co.,
361 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Mass. 1973); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 39698 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1970). InCulbertson
v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1975), for instance, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
seizure by a hotel manager of property belonging to a permanent resident, pursuant to Amz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-951, -952 (1974), constituted state action because the lien granted to
hotel and rooming house keepers was "purely statutory." 528 F.2d at 431.
11 It is clear that a warehouseman's lien was recognized by the common law. See Harbor
View Marine Corp. v. Braudy, 189 F.2d 481, 483 (1st Cir. 1951); Jewett v. City Transfer &
Storage Co., 128 Cal. App. 556, 18 P.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1933); Note, ProceduralDue Process-Post-Fuentes Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L. Rv.542, 543-44
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ProceduralDue Process]. This lien entitled the warehouseman
to retain goods stored until charges on them had been paid, Jewett v. City Transfer & Storage
Co., 128 Cal. App. 556, 18 P.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1933), but terminated upon delivery of the goods
to the bailor. Shingleur-Johnson Co. v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 78 Miss. 875, 29 So.
770 (1901). The lien attached only to the goods for which the charges were owed. See, e.g.,
Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La. 172, 31 So. 671 (1901); Southern Attractions
v. Grau, 93 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1956). To obtain enforcement, the warehouseman had to resort
to judicial proceedings. See Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900); R. BROWN,
THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.1, at 446 (3d ed. 1975).
The lien provisions of the U.C.C. expand the warehouseman's common law rights in two
respects. Under U.C.C. § 7-210, the warehouseman is permitted to enforce the lien himself.
See Schmidt v. Cohen Transfer & Storage Co., 170 Colo. 550, 463 P.2d 445 (1970) (statute
permitting warehouseman to sell goods expanded his common law remedies). In addition,
the statute allows the lien to attach to goods other than those for which payment is due. See
N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-209 (McKinney 1966) which provides: "If the person on whose account the
goods are held is liable for like charges or expenses in relation to other goods . . . the
warehouseman also has a lien against him for such charges and expenses .
Id. § 7209(1).
" See Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974);
Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974);
Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D. Conn. 1976); ProceduralDue Process, supra
note 39, at 551.
553 F.2d at 775 (Holden, J., dissenting).
42 Burke & Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay
on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. Rv.1, 47 (1973).
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expansion of the common law remedies standard is the public
function theory, which permits a finding of state action where a
statute delegates a state power to a private individual.13 In applying this test, the Second Circuit observed that execution of a warehouseman's lien was an activity traditionally performed by the
sheriff," and concluded that statutory authorization of a private
sale amounted to a delegation of a state function.45 It is suggested,
however, that the state function rationale does not require a finding
of state action in every instance in which a private individual engages in some activity previously performed by the state.46 Prior
decisions have suggested that the doctrine's use is limited to those
situations wherein the service is one that "the state itself is under
an affirmative duty to . . . [perform]." 4 Under this analysis, the
state function test is applied only to those actions which are per'3 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
Writing for the majority in Evans, Justice Douglas explained the state function rationale as
follows: "[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or
functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and
subject to its constitutional limitations." 382 U.S. at 299. See Note, State Action: Theories
for Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 CoLUm. L. REV. 656, 692-93
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Restrictions]. When the state action inquiry
arises in connection with a challenge to a lienholder's distraint of personal property pursuant
to state law, application of the state function test has often been held inappropriate. See,
e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp.
1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
11 553 F.2d at 771-72. A warehouseman's lien generally was enforced through a foreclosure
proceeding. See Howard v. J.P. Paulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 127 P. 284 (1912). The property
subject to the lien could be divested only by foreclosure sale. Hansel v. Hartford Court Trust
Co., 133 Conn. 181, 49 A.2d 666 (1946); Hurt v. Edwards, 347 Mo. 667, 148 S.W.2d 542 (1941);
Christiansen v. Strand, 82 S.D. 416, 147 N.W.2d 415 (1966). The sale usually was conducted
by a sheriff or a constable. See Race v. Dada, 102 N.Y. 298, 6 N.E. 592 (1886); Union Dime
Sav. Inst. v. Andariese, 83 N.Y. 174 (1880).
553 F.2d at 771.
46 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966).
Only those activities which
"traditionally [serve] the community," such as police and fire departments, as opposed to
social clubs, educational institutions, "and other like organizations in the private sector"
constitute state action when delegated to private persons. Id. at 302; accord, Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968).
" New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.
1975). In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Supreme Court recognized that by repealing legislation governing primary elections, the state was in effect delegating to a private
political organization its duty to regulate elections. Id. at 466. Similarly, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court held that even though a town may be owned and
managed by a private corporation, an individual may not be denied his constitutional protections because the state has "[permitted] a corporation to govern a community of citizens."
Id. at 509. Applying this rule, the Second Circuit, in Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761 (2d
Cir. 1974), held that where a private institution is given custody of abandoned children, it is
carrying out a traditional public function and is thus subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at
765.
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formed solely by the state. Since the execution of a lien is not an
exclusively governmental function, the private sale of property pursuant to section 7-210 does not amount to state action under this
theory.4 8
Although not applied by the Second Circuit, additional theories
developed by the court also seem relevant to the Brooks situation.
One such criterion, the "symbiotic relationship" test, leads to a
finding of state action when it is shown that a "rendering of mutual
benefits between a private creditor and the state"4 causes the two
to become in effect "partners in a joint effort.""0 In addition, there
must be an element of control by the state over the private individual sufficient to give rise to the inference that the latter is acting
on behalf of the state." Once this symbiotic relationship is found to
exist, the courts will deem the actions of the private persons to be
those of the state.52 State action may also be found if the state
encourages or compels a private individual to act in a designated
manner.5 3 Mere authorization of private conduct, however, is not
" See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 1975); Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968). The public function theory has been held inapplicable
in other situations where the challenged activity was not deemed a traditional state function.
See, e.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975) (private use
of public baseball fields); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d
906 (8th Cir. 1973) (national bank's seizure of borrower's collateral).
'1 Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976). The symbiotic relationship standard,
also known as the entwinement test, requires a finding that the state is financially or otherwise interdependent with the private activity. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961). In Burton a relationship between the state and a private restaurant located in a
building owned and operated by a state agency was held to satisfy this test, as the state had
in effect become a partner of the restaurant. Id. at 725. A symbiotic relationship may also be
found to exist where a private institution receives a substantial grant or loan from the state,
see, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 (2d Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974), as well as where "the state has elected to place
its power, property and prestige behind the defendant's actions," Ve-Ri-Tas v. Advertising
Review Council, 411 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (D. Colo. 1976); see Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d
436, 449 (2d Cir. 1969); Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52, 54 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (mem.);
Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Rackin
v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1002-04 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
10Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions & Security, 400 F. Supp. 249, 263 (M.D. Ala.
1975), aff'd mem., 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976).
11See Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F:2d 285, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1975); Lucas v. Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114
(1973); State Action, supra note 4, at 337 n.183.
See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
a Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967). Reitman involved a challenge to CAL.
CONST. art 1, § 26 which permitted private discrimination in real property conveyancing by
prohibiting the state from interfering in any way with the right of an individual to freely
dispose of his property. Because this amendment encouraged discrimination, the Court reasoned, it provided a sufficient basis for finding that the state was significantly involved in
the private discrimination. 387 U.S. at 381. See Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp.
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enough to satisfy this standard;54 the private acts must be required
by state or local law or custom in order to become the state's responsibility.5
It is submitted that a finding of state action in Brooks could not
be properly premised upon either of these two tests.56 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has determined that the governmental involvement
in the warehouseman's sale is too insignificant to warrant a finding
of state action under any standard. 7 Rather than confining its inquiry to a few salient considerations, that court attempted to examine all the factors suggestive of the state's actual involvement in the
lien enforcement procedure. Rejecting the expansion of common law
remedies" and state function theories" relied upon in Brooks, the
Ninth Circuit went on to conclude that there existed no "symbiotic"
relationship between the state and the warehouseman" and no state
encouragement of the challenged activity. 1 Moreover, it was ob390, 394 (N.D. Ill.
1972). The Supreme Court later indicated, however, that the determining
factor should be whether the "act by the private party is compelled by a statutory provision
or by custom having the force of law. . . ." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171
(1970) (emphasis added); see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Barrera v. Security Bldg.
& Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus, where the state has actually put its own
weight on the side of the [challenged activity] by ordering it," the requirement of significant
government involvement is met. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
(1974). See also Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
1 See, e.g., Teleco, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 511 F.2d 949, 951-52 (10th Cir.
1975); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009
(1974); Male v. Crossroads Assoc., 469 F.2d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1972).
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Peterson v. City of Greenville,
373 U.S. 244 (1963); Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.
1975); Barrera v. -Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Condosta v.
Vermont Elec. Coop., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 358 (D. Vt. 1975).
11It was found by the Brooks dissent, see note 31 and accompanying text supra, that
since § 7-210 neither commands the warehouseman's conduct nor creates a relationship
between the warehouseman and the government, a finding of state action may not be premised upon the encouragement of private activity or symbiotic relationship tests. 553 F.2d at
776 (Holden, J., dissenting).
541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976). In Melara, a homeowner's dispute arose between the
plaintiff and a warehouseman over charges allegedly due for the storage of goods. When the
storage company notified the plaintiff that the goods would be sold, under CAL. COM. CODE §
7-210 (West 1964), unless the bill was paid, an action under § 1983 was instituted. 541 F.2d
at 803.
" 541 F.2d at 805. The court characterized the "lack of common law origin" as a "factor
of dubious worth." Id.
' Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 807. The Ninth Circuit found that the Melara situation would not support a
"finding that a 'symbiotic relationship' existed between the private actor and the state
. . ." Id. at 806. According to that court, the relationship of the state and the warehouseman under § 7-210 is more closely akin to that of regulator-regulatee or licensor-licensee. Id.
at 807.
1I Id. The Melara court also found that there exists a relationship between the property
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served that mere regulation of a private activity will not convert
such conduct into state action.2
Despite the Brooks court's awareness of the broader inquiry
conducted by the Ninth Circuit and other federal courts in suits
challenging statutory remedies afforded to creditors,13 it limited its
analysis to the state function and expansion of common law remesubject to the U.C.C. lien and the underlying debt, and concluded that this factor militates
against a finding of state action. Id. at 808. Prior decisions have relied upon the absence of
such a relationship as partial support for the conclusion that a particular creditor's remedy
involves state action. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1975);
Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 336-37 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970). The Brooks majority rejected
this reasoning, however, stating that the relationship between the lien and the debt "bears
only upon the extent of the intrusion upon the debtor's property rights that the state has
authorized, and not upon whether the state has in fact delegated some of its sovereign power."
553 F.2d at 771 n.11.
62 541 F.2d at 806. The state regulation theory is based on the notion that pervasive
regulation and licensing by the state transforms certain activities into state action. Most
decisions discussing this theory have concluded that state regulation, however extensive, is
insufficient to support a finding of state action. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972); Brown v. District of Colum. Transit Sys., Inc., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 862 (1975); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir.
1975). In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Supreme Court
concluded that mere regulation by the state of a public utility, "where the commission has
not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute
a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into 'state action.' " Id.
at 357 (emphasis added). The Jackson opinion also pointed out that "the furnishing of utility
services is [neither] a state function [nor] a municipal duty." Id. at 353. If the creation
and regulation of a monopoly gives rise to a close relationship between the state and the
regulated entity, however, the actions of the latter might be imputed to the state. See Public
Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
The judicial reluctance to invoke the state regulation rationale was explained by the
Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972):
Since state-furnished services include such necessities of life as electricity, water,
and police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct set forth in The Civil
Rights Cases. . . and adhered to in subsequent decisions.
Id. at 173. See generally Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851, 855 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Burke &
Reber, StateAction, CongressionalPower and Creditors'Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973); ConstitutionalRestrictions, supra note 43, at 68889; State Action, supra note 4, at 326-28; 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 578, 582 (1974).
1 See 553 F.2d at 770-71. The Brooks majority noted that in disposing of state action
questions, other federal courts have examined the following factors:
whether the creditor's power amounts to a roving commission or exists only over
particular chattels that are closely connected with the debt; whether the creditor's
remedy was authorized by contract as well as statute; whether the creditor's resort
to the remedy was mandatory or optional; whether the state extensively regulates
the creditor's industry; and even whether title rests in the debtor or the creditor
Id. at 770.
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dies standards. It is suggested that had the Second Circuit undertaken a more extensive examination of the Brooks controversy, utilizing the other factors clearly relevant to a state action inquiry, it
might have concluded that the involvement on the part of the state
was insufficient to convert the storage company's conduct into state
action.
The Brooks decision seems to suggest a recent trend in the
Second Circuit toward liberal application of the state action requirement of section 1983 in order to protect the individual's constitutional rights. 4 While this concern for individual rights is salutary,
it is submitted that the Second Circuit in Brooks has overlooked the
important purpose underlying the state action requirement. 5 In so
doing, the court may have restrained the liberty of certain private
individuals by subjecting them to limitations not imposed by section 1983 or the fourteenth amendment. It is hoped that the Second
Circuit will continue its efforts to protect individual rights, but in
a manner that does not unduly minimize the importance of the state
action doctrine.
MarianA. Campbell

Editor's Note: As The Second Circuit Note goes to print, the Supreme Court has reversed Brooks. 46 U.S.L.W. 4438 (U.S. May 15,
1978). Rejecting the "public function" theory, the Court found that
the resolution of debtor-creditor disputes was not traditionally an
exclusive state function. The Court noted, moreover, that the New
York statutory scheme does not compel any action on the part of
warehousemen. It was concluded, therefore, that there exists insufficient state involvement to convert the warehouseman's conduct into
state action. Thus, the Supreme Court has resolved the conflict
between the Second and Ninth Circuits by opting for the position
of the latter court.
",

In Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975), and Jackson v. Statler

Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit found that state action may
be predicated upon the state's financial assistance, in the form of tax exemptions, to private
institutions. Although it traditionally has been held that grants of tax exemptions or benefits
are insufficient to satisfy state action requirements unless additional elements revealing
sufficient government participation are present, see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir.
1975); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974),

the Jackson and Weise courts reasoned that a less demanding state action standard should
be applied where basic civil liberties are at issue, see 522 F.2d at 406; 496 F.2d at 628-29,

635.

s See note 4 supra.

